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Doubting Doubts, Rescuing Beliefs 




In this introductory paper, I’d like to make three points about the works of Tamanaha. 
First, I will present the general view on his entire works with their various aspects, and 
point out that there lies an interesting consistency in his approaches to these subjects, 
which I will call “reflexive skepticism”. Second, I will argue that the foundation of this 
methodological approach is highly tied with his empathetic concern to the each 
individual society, together with its dynamics and variability. And lastly, I will examine 
how these considerations lead us to reflect on the method and the subject of today’s 
philosophy of law, and on the legal development in modern Japan. 
 
2. Wide Perspectives, Various Achievements 
Brian Z. Tamanaha is a very active and prolific researcher. He has so far published 
more than 50 articles through his career, published 8 books on different themes in recent 
20 years, each highly acclaimed from a wide range of fields. Notably, his concerns 
expand into so many aspects of legal practices and legal thoughts, with broad 
perspectives and deep insights. Even if summing them up a little crudely, I see his 
enterprises separated into at least five different arenas.  
The first arena relates to the understanding of experiences of transplantation and 
development of the western law in the non-western countries. As he himself repeatedly 
acknowledges1, he started his academic career with the reflections on his experience as 
an Assistant Attorney General of Yap State, Micronesia (and later as a Legal Counsel of 
Micronesian Constitutional Convention). In his first book, he tried to describe and 
                                                            
1 Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and A Social Theory of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
U.P., 1999) [hereafter, RSLT] xiv; A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) [hereafter, GJLS] xi. 
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investigate his experience as a legal official in Yap, while reflected on the methodology 
for this attempt2. And later he stepped into critical examination on the more general 
backgrounds of the so-called “Law and Development” studies and its core concepts — 
including the most basic assumptions of the dominant legal scholarship3. 
The second arena developed from this first arena, with a more abstract orientation. 
Here he ventured into theoretical considerations about the conceptual apparatuses so 
that they might more accurately capture the contemporary circumstances of globalism 
and legal pluralism. He argued for the necessity of construction of literally “general” 
theory of law, liberated from the conventional restrictive assumptions, such as the state 
law as an only source of theorization of law, and the legal system as necessary 
constituent of the social order. Instead, he advocated more empirically oriented theory 
of law with the emphasis on the interpretive understanding of social practice, first called 
“socio-legal positivism” and later, “social legal theory.”4 
Third arena may also be understood as an extension of the first arena, while it 
broadened much its perspective. As the one of the primary cause of Law and 
Development movement has been the establishment of the rule of law in the 
underdeveloped non-western countries, he scrutinized this concept from historical, 
political and theoretical perspectives5. This attempt revealed how the varieties of 
interpretations of this concept and their basic ideas have been formed and developed, 
and how the resulted ambiguity has incurred not only academic debates but also actual 
political conflicts.  
                                                            
2 Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia: An Interpretive Approach to Transplanted Law (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1993a) [hereafter, ULM]; “Looking at Micronesia for Insights About the Nature of Law and 
Legal Thinking” 41 The American Journal of Comparative Law 9 (1993b); “Custom and 
Constitutionalism in the Federated States of Micronesia,” 3 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 1 
(2002).  
3 Tamanaha, “Review Article: The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies,” 89 American Journal of 
International Law 470 (1995); “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,” 30 
Sydney Law Review 375 (2008b); “The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development,” 
44 Cornell International Law Journal 209 (2011a), “The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in 
Development,” 3 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1 (2011b).  
4 RSLT; GJLS; “Socio-Legal Positivism and a General Jurisprudence,” 21 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 (2001); “What is ‘General’ Jurisprudence?: A Critique of Universalistic Claims by 
Philosophical Concepts of Law”2 Transnational Legal Theory 287 (2011c); “The Third Pillar of 
Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory,” Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 13-04-01 (2013a) (unpublished: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256622) 
5 Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) [hereafter, ORL]; Tamanaha 2001b, supra note 3. 
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In the fourth arena, he turned his eyes upon two core subjects of the history of 
Anglo-American — mainly from the 19th to 20th century of the U.S. — legal thoughts, 
which were legal instrumentalism6 and legal formalism7. In both works he critically 
reexamined today’s conventional notions about history of legal thoughts, and detected 
their biases or distortions that have negatively affected to the ordinary legal practice, by 
citing wide range of writings of the judges as well as legal scholars. 
The fifth arena also seems to be a product of rather independent interest, that is, legal 
education — especially the training system of the legal professions in the present U.S. 
society. His latest book, Failing Law Schools8 harshly attacked the present condition of 
the law school system by pointing out how they seriously suffer from over-competition 
among themselves, limitless increase of the salaries of the professors, putting enormous 
economical burdens on their students. 
Now, such a cursory look of his entire bibliography would only give us an 
impression of discursiveness or ambiguity. In a way, it would not be easy for some 
readers to find any consistency in his arguments. Some might even find out several 
seemingly incoherent or contradictory claims in his writings9. Although each of his 
books and articles has its own clarity, the whole picture of his enterprises might leave a 
certain kind of vagueness and elusiveness. 
But, of course, this is not my conclusion. In spite of the diversity of perspectives and 
achievements, by following carefully the paths he has pursued, we can draw out some 
common threads running through these diverse enterprises. Particularly, I see the most 
distinguishing aspects of works of Tamanaha are obvious in his approaches of 
                                                            
6 Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006a) [hereafter, LME]; “How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 
DePaul Law Review 469 (2007). 
7 Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010) [hereafter, BFRD]; “Understanding Legal Realism,” 87 Texas Law Review 731 (2009). 
8 Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012)[hereafter, FLS]. And see 
also, “The Failure of Crits and Leftist Law Professors to Defend Progressive Causes,” 24 Stanford Law 
and Policy Review 309 (2013b). 
9 Compare, for example, his criticism of the “mirror thesis” in GJLS (esp. ch.3) with his advocacy of the 
tradition of social understandings of law in “The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence” [supra note 4], or his 
objection to the rejection of significance of “Law and Development” movement in an earlier article 
[Tamanaha 1995, supra note 3] with his own flat assertion of “entire failure” of this movement in later 
article [Tamanaha 2008b, supra note 3]. 
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problem-setting and underlying motives of the explorations, which here particularly I 
would like to turn to. 
 
3. Common Threads 
In my view, these threads have two aspects. One is relatively simple and clear, easy to 
follow in terms of our general understandings of legal thoughts. But the other is a little 
subtler and more intricate, nevertheless expresses a quite unique and interesting feature 
of his thought. 
a. Critical View from Legal Pragmatism 
As for the first aspect, it is rather obvious that his most basic concerns and perspectives 
have been shaped under the strong influence of legal pragmatism in a wide sense, 
including especially legal realism and critical legal studies10.  
As an heir of legal realism, he has always tried to understand law in its relation to the 
concrete social contexts. Law cannot function or be understood in isolation from its 
society, because it is not just an autonomous system of rules nor discrete commands of 
the rulers, but is always a product of social, political and economical forces and settings, 
and conversely, always effects to the constellations of these factors, too. Of course the 
relation between law and society is variable depending on the historical and cultural 
context. But even when a society and its law seriously conflict or are completely 
indifferent to each other, nature or significance of law has to be understood in its 
background. This legal realist or, contextualist approach is particularly apparent, for 
example, in his contemplation on the “mirror thesis” 11  and argument of the 
“connectedness” of society12. 
                                                            
10 RSLT, esp. ch.2. 
11 GJLS, esp. ch.3. (“Amidst this profusion of theories, however, a common presupposition can be found, 
that is: law is a mirror of society, which functions to maintain social order.” [GJLS, 3; emphasis original.] 
12 “…society is the all-consuming center of gravity of law and development. The term “society” is used 
here in a capacious sense — encompassing the totality of history, culture, human and material resources, 
religious and ethnic composition, demographics, knowledge, economic conditions, and politics. No 
aspect of law or development operates in or can be understood in isolation from these surrounding factors. 
The qualities, character, and consequences of law are thoroughly and inescapably influenced by the 
surrounding society. There can be no standard formula for law because every legal context in every 
society involves a unique constellation of forces and factors. A good law in one location may have ill 
5 
On the other hand, the influence of the CLS is also evident in his criticism of the 
“Law and Development”. For example, he accused self-righteous attitude of the 
practitioners and theorists who supported the development of the legal institutions of the 
non-western underdeveloped countries, or ruthlessly exposed the biases within the law 
school system in the U.S., which structurally block the poor students from pursuing 
legal professions. He also repeatedly casts doubts on the universal desirability of the 
rule of law, and sometimes emphasized its adverse effects13. These critical charges to 
the optimistic endorsement of the contemporary liberal legalism and liberal institutions 
show the rather moderated, but sill unmistakable influence from the Crits14. 
Then, can we simply classify the standpoint of Tamanaha as one of the variants of the 
leftist skeptic to the dominant legal theory and practice, represented by legal realism 
and CLS? I think not. And here lies the second (and more elusive) aspect of his thought. 
His arguments often deviate from, or sometimes seem to go flatly against the typical 
claims of the legal realists or the Critical Theorists. For example, although the subjects 
of his two books about the history of legal thought were set along with the concerns of 
legal realists — instrumentalist understanding of law and criticism of formalist 
approach to legal interpretation —, his basic arguments went almost contrary to them; 
he condemned legal instrumentalism as the principal cause of loss of faith to the idea of 
the “higher law” and decay of the rule of law in the U.S.15; and he maintained that the 
famous realists’ attacks on legal formalism and their advocacy of the radical 
rule-skepticism are mostly illusory, because even the representative “formalist” judges 
and legal scholars in the late 19th century had explicitly acknowledged the need of more 
flexible or purposive interpretation of law16. 
Furthermore, he has openly criticized the CLS’s claims, too. In “The Primacy of 
Society and the Failures of Law and Development,” he picked up the claim of the 
rule-skepticism by David Trubek, and contested that it sometimes had fatal damages to 
some societies. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
effects or be dysfunctional elsewhere” [Tamanaha 2011a, supra note 3, 219]. 
13 ORL, 124-126. 
14 For example, the Last chapter of ORL (“The Universal Human Good?”) is evidently echoing Morton 
Horwitz, “The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?” 86 The Yale Law Journal 561 (1977). 
15 See, LME, Pt.3; Tamanaha, “How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law,” 56 
DePaul L. Rev. 469 (2006b). 
16 See, BFRD, ch.5. 
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…While it is healthy to expose the exaggerations of legal formalism in Western legal 
systems where the legal systems are well-entrenched, it is an entirely different matter to 
export skepticism about legal formalism to societies in which law barely functions. 
Skeptical views of legal formalism can prevent a legal system from getting off the ground. 
A legal system cannot work if the very notion that legal officials are rule-bound is 
perceived to be a fraud. In the absence of any legal restraints, power has its way, and the 
powerless mass of people in developing countries will have little protection. 17 
In contrast to the CLS’s comprehensive skepticism to the possibility and desirability 
of the rule of law, or its suspicion of total failure of liberal legalism, Tamanaha is quite 
cautious about making such sweeping claims. Rather, he seems to be very skeptical of 
totalizing the skeptical views of legal realist or the Crits, just as well as totalizing the 
optimistic views of the dominant liberal legalists.  
 
b. Reflexive Skepticism 
Here lies the second — more elusive — aspect of the consistency of his enterprises. It 
might be said that the common threads in the various enterprises of Tamanaha are 
expressed in terms of his skepticism and cautiousness toward all kinds of unqualified 
theoretical extension of arguments without regard to the difference of contexts. 
Particularly, his own distinctiveness stands out in the fact that he has not hold back this 
critical attitude even toward the most radically skeptical arguments of legal realism or 
CLS, as well as toward the mainstream liberal legalist claims. 
Indeed, legal rules themselves do not automatically command certain conclusion 
without judge’s active involvement, and the rule of law or the bill of rights does not 
always guarantee peace and prosperity (or justice) to every society. Nevertheless, 
Tamanaha has carefully kept distance from the extreme rule-skepticism18 or blanket 
denial of the rule of law. While he rightly warns us about some defects and harmful 
effects of the rule of law, at the same time he willingly admits its universal values 
inherent in this principle.  
                                                            
17 Tamanaha 2011a, supra note 3, 241. 
18 See, BFRD, ch.10. 
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…the rule of law carries the ever-present danger of becoming rule by judges and lawyers. 
Aside from having obvious anti-democratic implications, this raises additional concerns 
in societies where judges and lawyers are drawn exclusively from the elite, or from some 
other discrete subgroup. Countries working to develop the rule of law must be cognizant 
of these and other potential problems.19 
When the rule of law is understood to mean that the government is limited by the law, the 
first cluster of meaning, Thompson is correct that it is a universal human good. The 
heritage of this idea, which first became firmly established in the Middle Ages, preexists 
liberalism; it is not inherently tied to liberal societies, or to liberal forms of government. 
Everyone is better off, no matter where they live and who they are, if government 
officials operate within a legal framework in both senses described, in the sense of 
abiding by the law as written, and in the sense that there are limits on law-making 
power.20  
Generally speaking, skepticism is quite prone to lapse into an easy agnosticism, 
especially when we lose sight of the reason or purpose of our doubt. But it is obvious 
that it is logically impossible to doubt everything. We can doubt something only when 
we believe some other things as self-evident. On the other hand, we also know that it is 
not always easy to identify what we actually believe, while we sometimes can express 
our doubts without any difficulty. It might be said that one of the most important role of 
skepticism is sorting out our hidden beliefs — securing what we cannot help believing 
but hardly be aware of — by doubting all that can be doubted. 
So, in my view, Tamanaha’s skeptical attitude toward the all-encompassing or 
destructive skepticism is not incomplete or halfway skepticism. Rather, it is a radical 
and elaborated way to find a belief worth believing through doubts upon doubts 
exhaustively— as it were, a reflexive skepticism.  
This balanced, moderate attitude typically characterizes his discussions, which has 
always impressed me. It seems to me that he has been trying to find a narrow leeway for 
some reliable beliefs between excessive optimism and pessimism about possibilities of 
desirable relationship between societies and their laws, through his cautiously skeptic 
                                                            
19 ORL, 5. 
20 ORL, 137-138. See also ORL 119. 
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attitude. Some legal philosophers who are seized by a kind of theory-mania have an 
unfortunate habit of reducing one’s “beliefs” totally to his commitment to some abstract 
principles or political, moral or theoretical standpoints. They classify others (or 
themselves) according to whether they commit or not to liberal legalism, accept or not 
the claim of indeterminacy of law, approve or not the transplantation of western legal 
system into nonwestern countries, belong or not to certain school of thought, etc. True, 
seen from this viewpoint, Tamanaha’s standpoint may look indecisive and ambiguous. 
However, as we saw thus far, his consistency clearly lies more in how he believes it, 
than what he believes.  
 
4. Rescued Beliefs, Underlying Motives 
Thus, here we can pose two questions. First, after screening out all the doubtful 
convictions and doubtful doubts, what credible beliefs about law did he find? Second, 
what is the components and foundation of this skeptic attitude? In other words, how did 
he actually discern the acceptable claims from the unacceptable ones? Both two 
questions are now worth exploring. 
But as for the first question, I do not have much to say here. In his works, he argued 
for the needs of legal development for non-western countries, not in the way of 
promoted by the “Law and Development” movements, but less state-centered or 
western-centered and more pluralistic and spontaneous way21; seeking legal theory not 
through the analytical nor the natural law approach, but through the more empirical — 
sociological, anthropological or historical — approaches22; the minimum but universal 
value of the rule of law as a constraint to state power23; the “balanced realism” in legal 
                                                            
21 “…Despite the largely negative tenor of this essay, …it must be emphasized that the message of this 
essay is not to turn away from legal development. Every society in the world today requires an effective 
legal system that can, at a minimum, manage and support the activities of governmental and economic 
systems. The great benefit of the rule of law, furthermore, is in erecting legal restraints on the 
government—and an effective state legal system can deliver this type of restraint. For these reasons, law 
must develop and every effort should be made to help legal institutions develop in positive ways, with the 
awareness that this is a unceasing project”[Tamanaha, 2011a, supra note 3, 244]. 
22 RSLT; GJLS; Tamanaha 2011c (supra note 4) ; 2013a (supra note 4); “Insights about the Nature of 
Law from History”, The 11th Kobe Memorial Lecture (2014). 
23 See above, note 20 and accompanying text. 
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practice, which requires compliance to the demands of legal rules and principles, but 
also allows rooms for purposive or consequentialist interpretations24; … and so on. 
But my own concern is now attracted more to the second question. I’m interested 
more in how he rescued his beliefs from multiple of doubts, than in what he actually 
rescued. So let me leave the first question to the other commentators in this volume, 
who will provide us insightful examinations of each argument in much more details. 
Instead, here I myself concentrate on the task of understanding of how he has started 
and advanced his explorations, especially expounding elements and foundations, and 
implications of this aspect of his enterprise. 
Looking back, Tamanaha’s cautious attitude to the ambiguous roles of law was quite 
apparent in his earliest studies. The experiences in Yap offered him an opportunity to 
“estrange” himself from the legal theories and practices he had been familiar with, just 
as David Trubek and Marc Galanter once pointed out25. Through the reflections on 
these experiences, he came to realize that the problem lies not only in the Yap society, 
but also in the transplanted legal system itself or the shared assumptions about it among 
“exporters” of the western legal system. But as I mentioned, Tamanaha’s critical 
reflection did not stop here. Instead of conforming entirely to such criticisms, he 
redirected his skeptical considerations toward them26. While many critics were satisfied 
with just accusing these projects of liberal legalism as repressive and illusory, he 
attempted to examine closely these criticisms in order to seek out the truly valuable 
aspects of these “repressive and illusory” projects, that is, the rule of law. 
This distinctive approach is pursued in his recent works more explicitly and 
self-consciously. 
…Legal positivists who write about the nature of law emphasize that legal institutions 
serve social functions. Critical theorists emphasize that law entrenches, normalizes, and 
enforces hierarchy and inequality within complex societies, assisted by ideological 
support from cultural, religious and political beliefs. The mainstream and the critical view 
                                                            
24 BFRD 186-196. 
25 David Trubek and Marc Galanter, “Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in 
Law and Development Studies in the United States,” 1974 Wisconsin Law Review 1062 (1974).  
26 For example, he pointed out deficit of “strong” legal pluralism, which dismissed the positive role of 
the state government, while overlooking mutual influences between state law and informal social norms, 
or between multiple social norms [ULM 11-12]. 
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each emphasize one side of law, downplaying the other. A full understanding sees both 
sides of law.27 
And he seemingly becomes more aware that this approach belongs to a tradition, which 
cannot be reduced to the legal positivist (analytic) approach nor the natural law 
approach, is traced its origin back to Montesquieu, developed by German historical 
jurisprudence, inherited by sociological jurisprudence or legal realism in the U.S. in the 
20th century28. These “third” approaches to the law share their interests in historical and 
cultural dynamics or variability of law29; find the source of law in the process of 
interactions between multiple social forces (rather than wills of the legislator)30; regard 
the society as an organic entity with complex structure that can hardly be manipulated 
from outside31. And they more or less emphasize the importance of the empirical 
researches as an indispensable means to cope with these tasks. 
Now let me note that Tamanaha’s reflexive skepticism has always been founded upon 
his strong concern to the functions of law in its society. It seems to me that his 
contemplation about the concept of law has been mostly guided by the concern to the 
various functions of law — both positive and negative effects, or ineffectiveness — to 
the society, neither to its institutional autonomy nor normative justification32. We might 
not be able to even recognize or evaluate the functions of certain law or legal system in 
a society without knowledge of the characteristic features and tendencies of the society, 
which constitute the “connectedness” of its society33 — or in Isaiah Berlin’s words, 
weave the “textures of life” of the people34. However we understand the concept of “law” 
— such as the command of the Sovereign or the result of democratic deliberation, the 
revelation of the god’s will or prescription of human reason —, its functions are 
revealed and tested ultimately in the processes of the society. Thus, the best 
                                                            
27 Tamanaha, “Insights about the Nature of Law from History”. 
28 ibid. See also Tamanaha 2013a. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. See also his concept of the “connectedness” of law and society [Tamanaha 2011a 222-225, 232]. 
32 As will be mentioned below, I think most of the motives or orientations of exploration of the concept 
of law can be classified into these three basic categories. Depending on which one is emphasized, resulted 
conceptions of law would make difference in their basic characteristics. 
33 Tamanaha, 2011a, 232. 
34 Isaiah Berlin, “The Sense of Reality” in Berlin, The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their 
History (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996) 26, 38. 
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interpretation of Tamanaha’s somewhat puzzling formulation of the concept of law35 
would be that “the society” is always the ultimate judge of the legality, i.e., what the 
law is to be determined by its functions in the social contexts or its processes.  
Tamanaha’s reflexive skepticism might be deeply rooted in these insights. Society’s 
needs and aspirations, or forms of life of its members, play a crucial role of a touchstone 
or compass of the legal development for each society. What the law or the legal system 
experiences in the social context is always an indispensable element of what the law 
actually is. These considerations constitute a prerequisite assumption for his entire 
enterprises. As a philosophical pragmatist, he provides this functionalist concept of law 
not as a conclusion of his explorations, but as a working hypothesis for them. 
 
5. Some Reflections on Philosophy of Law and Legal Development in Modern 
Japan  
As concluding remarks, let me add some brief thoughts about the implications of 
considerations thus far. What can we learn from Tamanaha’s reflexive skepticism? 
First, I basically agree with his criticism to the narrow-mindedness of contemporary 
trends of the philosophy of law. As far as I know, it is true to some degree that while 
recent studies of legal theory tend to stress the law’s institutional autonomy or its 
normative justification, they have not paid due attention to its functions. As Tamanaha 
recently pointed out36, the latter approach seems to be avoided even as a hindrance to 
the pursuit of universally true conceptions of the legal system. It may be because 
identifying the functions of law and its social contexts naturally requires relying on 
some kind of empirical studies, which mainly deal with the contingent and particular 
elements of each society. However, lack of concern to the functions of law — ignorance 
of or indifference to how legal rules and principles are actually formed and reformed, or 
how they operate or are respected in the particular social process — might seriously 
damage the sensitivity to where and how the materials of legal theory should be sought.  
                                                            
35 “Law is whatever people identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law’ (or droit, recht, etc.)” 
GJLS 166 [emphasis omitted]. 
36 Tamanaha 2011c 289-290; 2013a. 
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On the other hand, the functionalist approach may have its own shortcomings. In 
particular, if we put too much emphasis on the functions of law, it seems to me that two 
problems will arise immediately, and they would directly bring two difficulties to the 
studies or practices of legal development. To put it bluntly, One is a problem of 
conservatism; as we emphasize the complexity (or, “connectedness”) of the society, it 
may become harder to consciously take an active part in the process of the development, 
because of lack of reliable knowledge to do so. We may well be hesitant to take 
reformist policies. And the other is problem of interventionism (and limitless legal 
instrumentalism); contrary to the conservatism, as far as we confidently believe that we 
can comprehend the needs and desires of the society and design the (legal) means to 
fulfill them, the border between the promotion (or assistance) of development and the 
enforcement (or imposition) of development will be easily blurred and lost. Although 
Tamanaha has strongly criticized the self-righteous interventionism of the “Law and 
Development” studies and practices, it seems to me that he still does not find a 
promising way of getting through between these two difficulties37. 
Furthermore, when focusing on the particular circumstances in Japan, things would 
become more complicated. Modern Japanese society has lived through major legal 
transplantations twice (or three times?) in these 120 years. Compared to other societies 
with similar experiences, it seems that these projects were outstandingly successful in 
Japan, in that they scarcely provoked serious social confrontations or effective 
objections to them. Even during the time of their greatest crisis, in the period of 
nationalism and totalitarianism, the general framework of transplanted legal system was 
maintained and played its roles for the most part; and the defeat in the WW II provided 
just another opportunity for imitation of and adaptation to the modern western legal 
system on a large scale. By these comparatively fortunate and successful experiences of 
legal development, modern Japanese society seems to have dispensed with the radical 
doubt on the possibility or desirability of the legal transplantation projects in Japan. 
                                                            
37 Also note the ambiguity of the idea of “development”. It sometimes means just growing — that is, 
naturally and spontaneously thriving — and becoming more mature, advanced, or elaborate, but 
sometimes mean causing to grow — that is, forcibly or encouragingly promoting maturity or 
advancement.  
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But were they really “fortunate and successful” experiences? Of course yes in one 
respect, but at least it is undeniable that they have accompanied some crucial sacrifices. 
A Japanese Sinologist Yoshimi Takeuchi once compared the modernization process of 
Japan with that of China, pointed out that while the former had proceeded very 
smoothly and achieved a solid success, the latter had faced lots of political or cultural 
resistance and conflicts and brought about substantive sacrifices. In the functionalist 
perspective, it would be quite obvious that modernization projects were successful in 
Japan, failed in China. 
But Takeuchi thinks quite differently. According to his diagnosis, the great “success” 
of Japanese society was a result of its blind earnestness and meek obedience, pursuing 
its given (or forced) object without questioning to it. On the other hand, the hardships of 
Chinese society was caused mainly by the awareness of profound discomfort and doubt 
toward the values and institutions that were being imported from the western countries 
into China, as well as toward the stubborn and repressive Chinese traditions or customs 
at that time38. Upon this comparison, Takeuchi argued that the excellence of Japanese 
society is a product of their sheer servility, blindness to their own subordination and 
loss of intellectual or moral independence. Indeed, he tacitly questioned the shallowness 
and fragility of the modernity of Japanese society. 
Thus, in Takeuchi’s view, in the society like Japan, the well-functioning legal system 
still may not indicate its endorsement of or reliance on the law. Rather, Japanese society 
might be just insensitive or indifferent to the significance of transplanted laws, because 
its “social context” does not play the substantive role of the touchstone for the function 
of law, contrary to Chinese society. For example, in Japan when people think about the 
functions of their law, unconsciously they see only the effectiveness of the government 
power, not the law’s inherent force — or more exactly, they do not distinguish those 
two. So in this case, the core assumption or working hypothesis of Tamanaha does not 
seemingly work well in Japanese society — because people define the law as “whatever 
the government identifies and treats as ‘law’”. 
                                                            
38 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “What Is Modernity? (The Case of Japan and China),” in Takeuchi (Richard F. 
Calichman ed. & trans.), What Is Modernity?: Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi, (Columbia University Press, 
2005). 
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Still, I myself am quite sympathetic to the approach that Tamanaha employed. As far 
as I understand, his reflexive skepticism will contribute to grope for what actually 
should be (or should have been) accepted and relied on in the transplanted legal system 
of Japan. But to do this, we will have to learn more from the experiences of failure, and 
the defiant, recalcitrant and stubborn part of this society. An aphorism of ancient China 
says, “To trust in what is trustworthy is trustworthiness. To doubt what is doubtful is 
also trustworthiness”39. Takeuchi loved to cite the latter phrase, reinterpreting; “To 
doubt your own doubt is another route toward your conviction”. Thus, as far as we 
doubt our success in legal development of Japanese society — and our doubts about our 
own achievements as well, we can unveil the real significance of the legal development 
or the rule of law. In this sense, the experience of Japanese society, which belongs to 
one of the most “developed” society in the non-western world, offers an irreplaceable 





                                                            
39 Xunzi: The Complete Text (translated with an introduction by Eric L. Hutton), Princeton University 
Press, 2014, 42-43. 
